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The Forgotten Threat:
Private Policing and the State
ELIZABETH E. JOH*
ABSTRACT
What do Disneyland, the Abu Ghraib U.S. military prison, the Mall ofAmerica,
and the Y-12 nuclear security complex in Oak Ridge, Tennessee have in common?
They have wildly different purposes, but they share a common characteristic as em-
ployers of private police. This answer-indicative of the prevalence and numbers of
private police today-would have struck the nineteenth -century observer as evidence
of a gross failure by the state. Yet that reaction, in turn, would seem odd to us. Vocal
support of private police can be found among public police chiefs, lawmakers, and
even President Bush.
What kinds of criticisms were once leveled at private police by public officials?
How did one attitude, deeply skeptical of private police, evolve into another that sees
heavy reliance upon private policing as beneficial, or at least benign? Here, I take a
fiesh look at the dynamics of that change, and by doing so, restore to theirproper place
fundamental questions about the use of police who are privately financed and orga-
nized in a democratic society. These questions, and the violent history that midwived
them, have been largely and undeservedly forgotten by the legal literature.
Using this historical perspective, I examine the shifting status of private policing:
first, by examining the history ofpublic criticism directed against them; second, by re-
counting the partnership model that first gained a foothold in studies sponsored by the
federalgovernment in the 1970s and 1980s; and third, by questioning the meaning and
intentions behind the idea of partnership advanced today.
*Acting Professor of Law, University of California, Davis (eejoh@ucdavis.edu). Ph.D. 2004,
J.D. 2000, New York University; B.A. 1994, Yale University. Thanks to Paul Chevigny, David
Garland, Charles Reichmann, and Jerome Skolnick for their comments and suggestions, to the
staff of the U.C. Davis Law Library, Erin Murphy, and Rachel Phillips for research assistance, and
to Dean Rex Perschbacher, Associate Dean Kevin R. Johnson, and the U.C. Davis Law School for
financial assistance and institutional support.
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INTRODUCTION
God help them tonight in the hour of their affliction
Praying for him who they'll ne'er meet again
Hear the poor orphans tell their sad story
Father was killed by the Pinkerton men.
- WILLIAM W. DELANEY, Father was Killed by the Pinkerton
Men'
Here the basic issue is one of government: May a portion of the po-
lice power be sold to a private corporation to be thereafter exer-
cised by its employees for its profit?
-JUsTICE TALBOT SMITH, People v. Robinson
2
The moment is at hand for corporate interests and public law en-
forcement to make a ... gesture and forge a professional bond. Its
creation would serve the welfare of all citizens by producing far-
reaching benefits for American policing.
- MICHAEL G. SHANAHAN, Private Enterprise and the Public
Police: The Professionalizing Effects of a New Partnership3
What do Disneyland, the Abu Ghraib U.S. military prison, the Mall of
America, and the Y-12 nuclear security complex in Oak Ridge, Tennessee have
in common? These places have wildly different purposes (civil defense, recre-
ation) and identities (public, private, or quasi-private). Yet there is a commonal-
ity: each employs private police.' Less obvious is that this answer-indicative of
the prevalence and numbers of private police today-would have stunned an
observer from the vantage point of the late-nineteenth century. Surely, our time
traveler would remark, the dominance of private policing represents the failure
of the state, and a crisis in public confidence. Yet that reaction would seem odd
1. This was a popular song penned by William Delaney, more commonly known as "Willie
Wildwave." See ROBERT M. LA FOLLETTE, STRIKEBREAKING SERVICES, S. REP. No. 76-6, at 14 n.2
(1939).
2. People v. Robinson, 74 N.W.2d 41,47 (Mich. 1955) (Smith, J., dissenting).
3. Michael G. Shanahan, Private Enterprise and the Public Police: The Professionalizing Effects of
a New Partnership, in POLICE LEADERSHIP IN AMERICA 449, 458 (William A. Geller ed., 1985).
4. See Elizabeth E. Joh, The Paradox of Private Policing, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 49, 55
(2004) (defining private policing as the "various lawful forms of organized, for-profit personnel
services whose primary objectives include the control of crime, the protection of property and life,
and the maintenance of order" (emphasis omitted)). Although I excluded private military compa-
nies from my definition in Joh,supra, I begin this article with their inclusion to provide a sense of
how prevalent the use of private civil and military police forces has become.
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to our contemporary ears. We live at a time when public police chiefs, legislators,
and policymakers openly support reliance on private police and, indeed, encour-
age public partnerships with them. A presidential initiative even exhorts in-
creased support for private policing as a component of post-9/ll "homeland
defense."5
What kinds of criticisms were once leveled at private police by public offi-
cials? How did one attitude, deeply skeptical of the private police, evolve into
another that sees private policing as inherently benign? This article takes a fresh
look at the dynamics of that change, and by doing so, restores to their proper
place fundamental questions about the use of police who are privately financed
and organized in a democratic society. These questions, and the violent history
that midwived them, have been largely and undeservedly forgotten by the legal
literature.
The need for a historical perspective on private policing is more urgent than
ever. Private police employment in the United States is greater than it has ever
been, 6 yet critics and supporters alike largely ignore the lessons that the history
of private policing has to offer.7 Critics raise issues of accountability, and the pri-
vate usurpation of a government function. Advocates cite the benefits of
cheaper, more responsive alternatives to the public police. Yet these issues are not
new, and much can be learned from more than a century of experience with pri-
vate policing.
So too can history show us that the relationship between the state8 and pri-
vate policing is not accurately described as one of intermittent regulation.
Whether it encourages by inaction, or discourages through legislation and pub-
lic critique, the state is always implicated in the development of private polic-
5. THE WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR THE PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURES AND KEY ASSETS 29 (2003) (identifying "private security officers" as "an impor-
tant source of protection for critical facilities"), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/pcipb/
physical-strategy.pdf.
6. Joh,supra note 4, at 55 (observing that there are at least three private guards for every public
police officer and that at least twice as much is spent on private policing as is spent on public
policing).
7. Two important exceptions are Clifford D. Shearing, The Relation Between Public and Pri-
vate Policing, 15 CRIME & JUST. 399 (1992), reprinted in MODERN POLICING 399 (Michael Tonry &
Norval Morris eds., 1992), and a discussion in David A. Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L.
REV. 1165, 1212-29 (1999).
8. By state, I mean here the sovereign political body organized under one government, not a
subordinate unit in a federal system.
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ing.' Thus, while it may be convenient to speak of a notable lack of regulation
over private police as a regulatory lapse,' ° the state here is also taking a stance to-
ward private policing, through its failure to act.
The discussion that follows examines the shifting status of private policing:
first, by examining the history of skepticism and criticism directed at them dur-
ing the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, particularly in media
attention and in congressional investigations; second, by recounting the partner-
ship model that first gained a foothold in studies sponsored by the federal gov-
ernment in the 1970s and 1980s; and third, by questioning the meaning and
intentions behind the idea of partnership advanced today.
None of the historical moments examined here can be characterized as
wholly critical or entirely positive. Nor do the attitudes described here represent
the unified efforts of one group or individual. If anything, each critical moment,
viewed with the benefit of hindsight, represents but one choice over other possi-
bilities. Indeed, the evolution of public attitudes toward private policing demon-
strates that the emerging conventional wisdom of partnership was hardly an
inevitabie result. We can extend this observation further: The history of private
police entanglement in unsavory events suggests that the increased adoption of
these partnerships will likewise see its own share of problems.
I. THE EMERGENCE OF PRIVATE POLICING AS A THREAT
From their emergence in the nineteenth century as competitors of the public
police, to their targeting by congressional investigation in the early-twentieth
century, private police have been the recipients of criticism and rebuke. Their
very existence, as this section shows, raised fundamental doubts about the ability
of the state to take care of its own citizens.
A. Competing with the New Public Police
The slow establishment of public police departments in American cities of
the nineteenth century," and the even slower turn toward a professional, highly-
9. I have very loosely adapted this idea from Howard Becker's observations on the involve-
ment of the state in art. See HOWARD S. BECKER, ART WORLDS 165-91 (1982).
10. Cf. Joh,supra note 4,at 107-09 (describingthe paucity ofcurrent regulationon private police
behavior).
11. See ERIC H. MONKKONEN, POLICE IN URBAN AMERICA, 1860-1920, at 42 (1981) (citing the
gradual transition from a constable-watch system to the establishment of public police depart-
ments in Boston, 1838-59; in New York, 1843-53; and in Cincinnati, 1848-59).
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trained police force, 2 led many people to rely upon the services of private detec-
tive agencies and watchmen services. 3 The average public patrol officer of the
late-nineteenth century was well-paid compared to other skilled urban workers,
but poorly trained, if at all.' 4 Moreover, his' 5 relative isolation while working his
"beat," compounded by the lack of technological means to communicate with
the precinct station house, encouraged behavior that relied more on wits and
practical experience than on formal law.' 6 Deficient, too, in the eyes of many
urban dwellers were the small number of available public officers, made even
less helpful by their poor organization. 17
Urban residents in particular were already acquainted with an informal,
private system for the retrieval of stolen property, operated by the constabulary,
12. See, e.g., SAMUEL WALKER, A CRITICAL HISTORY OF POLICE REFORM: THE EMERGENCE OF
PROFESSIONALISM 56-57 (1977) (arguing that the signs of professionalism in policing, such as jour-
nals and organizations, did not completely emerge until the twentieth century).
13. There appears to be no reliable source for estimating the number of private police in the
United States in the nineteenth century, save for the records of a few companies and the occasional
newspaper report. Before a congressional investigative committee, Robert Pinkerton of the Pink-
erton National Detective Agency said that his company employed 600 persons, but this number
included guards. detectives, clerks, and stenographers. See H. R. REP. No. 52-2447, at 193 (1893);
see also Private Police Equals McAdoo Force in Numbers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22,1905, at SM4 (stating
that there were in New York City "upward of 4,000 special policemen" as "guardians of private
property," a number that was "equal in numbers to the force of policemen that [the Police] Com-
missioner McAdoo ha[d] on duty for the night patrols in both boroughs").
14. See DAVID R. JOHNSON, POLICING THE URBAN UNDERWORLD: THE IMPACT OF CRIME ON THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMERICAN POLICE, 1800-1887, at 90-94, 101-03 (1979); see also Mark H.
Haller, Historical Roots of Police Behavior: Chicago, 1890-1925, 10 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 303 (1976) (ar-
guing that public police in the nineteenth century were not particularly oriented toward legal
norms).
15. Until the last half of the twentieth century, policing was an exclusively male occupation,
with the exception of police matrons responsible for female prisoners. See Albert J. Reiss, Jr., Police
Organization in the Twentieth Century, 15 CRIME & JUST. 51, 61 (1992), reprinted in MODERN POLIC-
ING, supra note 7, at 51, 61.
16. See JOHNSON,supra note 14, at 109-10; Samuel Walker, "Broken Windows"and Fractured His-
tory: The Use and Misuse of History in Recent Police Patrol Analysis, in CLAsSICs IN POLICING 97, 101
(Steven G. Brandl & David E. Barlow eds., 1996) (observing that the adoption of the two-way
radio and the patrol car increased response to citizen complaints).
17. See JOHNSON,supra note 14, at 119. The new police also initially balked at the idea of wearing
uniforms (though not at carrying firearms). See Roger Lane, Urban Police and Crime in
Nineteenth-Century America, 15 CRIME & JUST. 1, 11-12, 15 (1992), reprinted in MODERN POLICING,
supra note 7, at 1, 11-12.
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for a fee.' 8 In the era before the "new" police were established, constables found
little contradiction in simultaneously performing what we would think of today
as private and public duties. Constables developed mutually agreeable relation-
ships with a new class of "underworld" informers: the provision of information
meant no arrest.'9 When these constables became incorporated into the fledgling
public police departments, many victims of property crime continued to offer
discreet rewards to them for the return of stolen goods.2' After a number of well-
publicized scandals, however, state courts moved to prohibit the availability of a
reward system to the public police. 2'
Yet the concept of private compensation for police work did not disappear.
Many former constables responded to legal prohibitions on rewards by forming, in
the 1840s, private organizations of "Independent Policemen" that targeted pick-
pockets and burglars. 22 By the 1860s, for ten to twelve dollars a week, banks and
other businesses could engage the services of private investigators to test their em-
ployees' honesty.23 These private services "siphoned off some of the best talent
available to the new [public] departments and provided citizens with an alternative
means of recovering property. '24 Private police also filled needs in the rural west-
ern United States, where in some areas virtually no public police existed at all.25
18. See JOHNSON, supra note 14, at 45-47; Stephen Davies, The Private Provision of Police During
the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, in THE VOLUNTARY CIn' 151, 158 (David T. Beito et al.
eds., 2002) (noting that advertisements seeking information on stolen property and for prosecu-
tion began to appear in British newspapers in the 1730s).
19. See JOHNSON, supra note 14, at 47.
20. See id. at 48-50. Johnson describes in detail how the private reward system discouraged pub-
lic officers from seeking arrests. Id. at 41-67.
21. Id. at 50; see also Pool v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 219 (1849) (holding that a city
watchman could not recover an award for apprehending an arsonist); Hatch v. Mann, 15 Wend.
44, 49 (N.Y. 1835) (holding "[t]hat a public officer, whose fees are prescribed by law, may maintain
an action to recover an additional sum promised him by a party for doing his official duty, is a
monstrous proposition, fraught with every kind of mischief"); Smith v. Whildin, 10 Pa. 39, 40
(1848) ("It would open a door to profligacy, chicanery, and corruption, if the officers appointed to
carry out the criminal law were permitted to stipulate by private contract ... ").
22. JOHNSON, supra note 14, at 60 (noting their establishment in St. Louis, 1846; in Baltimore,
1847; and in Philadelphia, 1848).
23. Private Detectives, Letter to the Editor, Private Detectives: A Defence of the System by One of
the Craft, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 1869, at 2.
24. JOHNSON, supra note 14, at 60.
25. See Robert P. Weiss, An Interpretation of the Origin, Development and Transformation of
Private Detective Agency Policing in the United States, 1850-1940, at 32 (Aug. 20, 1979) (unpub-
lished Ph.D. dissertation, Southern Illinois University at Carbondale) (on file with author).
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Without the protection of a national police force,26 railroad companies like the
Illinois Central, Michigan Central, Michigan Southern, and others-necessarily
crossing multiple jurisdictional boundaries within their ordinary course of
business-turned to private police firms. Of these, the most prominent was the de-
tective agency founded by Allan Pinkerton in 1850.27
Although they did not want for business, these private police were not free
from criticism. 28 Some public officials complained of the perceived competition
between private and public police, as did Chicago mayor John Wentworth
(1857-58; 1860-61), for example, at his 1857 inaugural address. He stated:
Our police system has been gradually falling into disrepute; and it
is a lamentable fact that, whilst our citizens are heavily taxed to
support a large police force, a highly respectable private police is
doing a lucrative business. Our citizens have ceased to look to the
public police for protection, for the detection of culprits or the re-
covery of stolen property.
29
26. While the Postal Inspection Service existed before the Declaration of Independence, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (initially the Department of Justice's Bureau of Investigation) was
not created until 1924. See William A. Geller & Norval Morris, Relations Between Federal and
Local Police, 15 CRIME & JUST. 231, 243 (1992), reprinted in MODERN POLICINc, supra note 7, at 231,
241-42. Nor were there many state-wide police during the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth
centuries. By 1900, only three states-Texas, Massachusetts, and Arizona-had established state
police departments. FRANK MORN, "THE EYE THAT NEVER SLEEPS": A HISTORY OF THE PINKERTON
NATIONAL DETECTIVE AGENCY 168 (1982).
27. See Milton Lipson, Private Security: A Retrospective, 498 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. ScI.
11, 17 (1988) (describing the employment of Pinkertons by railroad companies). In the 1870s and
1880s, the railroad companies became increasingly reluctant to pay Pinkerton's rates and were
wary of negative publicity regarding the private police. MORN, supra note 26, at 94. Eventually, a
number of states enacted legislation that allowed railroads to establish their own police forces with
peace officer powers. By 1914, there were between 12,000 and 14,000 such railway police. NAT'L
ADVISORY COMM. ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, PRIVATE SECURITY 31 (1976) [here-
inafter NAT'L ADVISORY COMm. REPORT].
28. Of private store detectives, for instance, a New York Times editorial commented: "Instances
of consummate ability on the part of detectives in the higher walks of their profession are suffi-
ciently rare; among the astute persons who dog the steps of suspected visitors in front of shop-
counters, hopeless stupidity seems to be disagreeably prevalent." Editorial, N.Y. TIMES, May 28,
1878, at 4.
29. John Wentworth, Mayor, City of Chicago, Ill., Inaugural Address (Mar. 10, 1857), in CHI.
DAILY DEMOCRAT, Mar. 11, 1857, available at http://www.chipublib.org/004chicago/mayors/
speeches/ventworth57.html.
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Others more directly faulted the questionable methods employed by some
private police officers. Newspaper accounts reported of "outrageous iniquities"
perpetrated by private detectives in divorce cases, and of those who engaged in
"sweating," or threatening, potential complainants from going to the public po-
lice about their clients.3" Courts took notice of the poor reputation of private de-
tectives. By the end of the 1880s, most states required the corroboration of a
private detective's testimony before accepting it in matrimonial cases.3' The
highest court of New York state, for instance, observed in 1889 that the testi-
mony of "prostitutes and private detectives" was to be given little weight in di-
vorce cases.
32
B. "Knights of Capitalism"33
After the Civil War, coal-mining, manufacturing, and steel-production
companies turned to private police agencies like Pinkerton's not simply for
property protection, but also to combat labor-related violence. This was no small
task. The federal Department of Labor estimated that between 1881 and 1900,
some 22,793 strikes had occurred throughout the country.34 It was their role in
quelling labor unrest that would bring private police their greatest disrepute
until the time of the New Deal.35 Of the private police services, the Pinkerton
National Detective Agency played a leading role in providing these companies
with employees to act as strike guards, "scabs" (substitute workers), undercover
agents, and "strike missionaries. ' 'B6 In the period from 1866 to 1892, the Pinker-
30. See, e.g., Entering Private Rooms by Force, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1880, at 8; The Private-
Detective Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1889, at 5.
31. MORN, supra note 26, at 76.
32. Moller v. Moller, 22 N.E. 169 (N.Y. 1889).
33. This term is borrowed from MORN,supra note 26, at 91.
34. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR, STRIKES AND LOCKOUTS, SIXTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COM-
MISSIONER OF LABOR 340 (1901). While the Pinkerton agency provided guards to race tracks in the
1890s and 1900s, in the 1880s, the guard system was used chiefly in strikes. MORN, supra note 26, at
99. See also S. REP. No. 52-1280, at 63 (1893).
35. George Rigakos observes that similar police forces existed in Canada and Britain during this
period, but did not engage in the same degree of violent activity. GEORGE S. RIGAKOS, THE NEW
PARAPOLICE 11 (2002).
36. Strike missionaries either urged strikers to violence or acted as propagandists against the
strike. See STRIKEBREAKING SERVICES, S. REP. No. 76-6, pt. 1, at 2 (1939); Weiss,supra note 25, at 98-
99 (describing types of private police involvement); Campbell v. Commonwealth, 84 Pa. 187 (1877)
(describing the infiltration of the "Molly Maguires," a group of Irish immigrant coal miners in-
volved in labor violence, by James McPharlan, an undercover Pinkerton detective).
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ton agency alone took part in seventy strikes.3 7 By the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury, "Pinkerton" had become a generic term for all private police.3"
Although the private police in all forms drew some criticism from the press
during the last two decades of the nineteenth century,39 the Homestead Riot of
July 6, 1892-"an epic in labor h"story" 4"-proved to be a decisive moment of
public scrutiny. Facing a strike by workers in his Homestead, Pennsylvania steel
works, Henry Clay Frick of Carnegie Steel arranged to have some 300 Pinker-
ton guards travel by rail to Youngstown, Ohio, where they embarked on barges
down the Monongahela River to Homestead.4 Mistaking the guards for scabs,
the striking workers engaged in exchanges of gunfire with the frightened Pink-
erton guards (many of whom appear to have been misled about their assign-
ment).4 2 Three workers and seven guards were killed, and scores more were
wounded.43 Outnumbered, the Pinkerton guards surrendered, and were beaten
by an angry mob.44 State troops called by the state's governor occupied the plant
without incident four days later.45
37. Robert Pinkerton gave this number in his testimony to the Senate committee investigating
the Homestead riots. S. REP. No. 52-1280, at 247 (1893).
38. MoRN, supra note 26, at 102.
39. A number of states, responding to public antipathy to "Pinkerton men," passed laws be-
tween 1879 and 1911 that, for the most part, either prohibited the importation of guards from
other states or forbade employment of armed guards within the state under specified circum-
stances. S. REP. No. 76-6, pt. 1, at 14-17 (1939); see, e.g., Sowing Sharp Language, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan.
22, 1887, at 3 (reporting adoption by the State Trades Assembly in Albany of a resolution criticiz-
ing "a section of the mobilized army of Hessian murderers, known as the Pinkerton detectives"
and stating that "there should be a law forbidding the employment of armed or unarmed men of
any private police force for any purpose whatever").
40. J. Bernard Hogg, Public Reaction to Pinkertonism and the Labor Question, 11 PA. HIST. 171,
179 n.23 (1944).
41. The story of the Homestead event is recounted in numerous sources. See, e.g., H.R. REp. No.
52-2447, at vi-ix (1893); William C. Oates, The Homestead Strike, 155 N. AM. REv. 355 (1892).
42. See S. REp. No. 52-1280, at 68-69 (testimony of John W. Holway).
43. Oates, supra note 41, at 360.
44. H.R. REP. No. 52-2447, at ix (1893).
45. See Lipson,supra note 27, at 19-20. Several of the strikers were later indicted for treason. See
The Homestead Case, 1 Pa. D. 785 (1892).
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C. Federal Investigations
National attention to Homestead 46 prompted investigations by Congress, al-
though the House of Representatives had already begun to turn its attention to
private policing before July of 1892. 47 In support of a House resolution to exam-
ine private policing, Representative William Jennings Bryan (1891-95) had de-
clared in May that the protection of life and property "should not be transferred
to private individuals and hired detectives until we are ready to acknowledge
government a failure."48 In November of 1892, a Senate committee, in hearings
in Chicago, Pittsburgh, and New York, heard testimony not just from the Pink-
erton agency but also from its competitors, including Thiel's Detective Service,
the United States Detective Agency, Mooney and Boland Detective Agency, and
the Illinois Detective Agency, about their role in policing labor unrest.49
Both the House and Senate committees were highly critical of the use of pri-
vate police against striking workers, but placed blame on the states for failing to
provide public protection for the employers' unquestioned right to defend their
private property. In its concluding statements, for example, the Senate investiga-
tive committee stated that the "use of private armed men is an assumption of the
State's authority by private citizens.""° "Anarchy" was inevitable where "the
State is incapable of protecting its citizens in their rights of person and
property .... Likewise, the report of the House of Representatives both reaf-
firmed the right to protect private property and condemned the "sloth and dila-
toriness of the civil authorities to render efficient and prompt protection to
persons and property. 5
2
46. See, e.g., Editorial, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 1892, at 4 ("There is no doubt that the employment
by capitalists of a large force of trained private police in case of trouble with workmen has a very
exasperating effect. A force of this kind causes fierce antipathy where regular officers of the law
might command respect and submission.").
47. Representative Thomas Watson had suggested an investigation in January of 1892, 23
CONG. REC. 4225 (1892), but an inquiry did not begin in earnest until after the Homestead riots.
48. Id. (statement of Rep. Bryan).
49. See generally S. REP. No. 52-1280 (1892).
50. Id. at xv.
51. Id.
52. H.R. Rap. No. 52-2447, at xv-xvi (1893); see also id. at xxviii (views of Congressman James
Buchanan) ("[Ilt is said that owners of property must be enabled to protect their property. So they
must.... [But] [t]o attempt to supplant Ithe public] system by the introduction of irresponsible
hirelings by each property owner, as he in his own mind determines they are needed, is to permit
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Despite drawing national attention to their abuses,5 3 the Homestead hear-
ings failed to produce meaningful changes in the regulation of private policing. 54
The Homestead controversy did, however, midwife passage of the "Pinkerton
law,"55 prohibiting the federal government and the District of Columbia from
hiring any "employee of the Pinkerton Detective Agency, or similar agency," as
well as similar provisions in the states."s Loopholes in these new laws, however,
failed to prevent private police agencies from continuing to profit from labor-
related work.57 Criticism had failed to materialize into restraint.
(Of course, private police were not entirely free from legal scrutiny in this
period. Pennsylvania courts appear to have been particularly wary of them, per-
haps because the Homestead riot was so familiar. Some Pennsylvania state court
judges, for example, denied applications for private detective licenses solely on
the ground that there were too many in the profession already.) 58
each man to set up a government of his own at his own will."); The Homestead Case, 1 Pa. D. 785,
789 (1892) (stating that Carnegie Steel "had the undoubted right to protect its property"). As J.
Bernard Hogg notes, however, the condemnation of private policing did not translate into greater
sympathy for striking workers. See Hogg, supra note 40, at 195 (noting that "all classes were
agreed on the inviolate rights of property and the sanctity of the individual right of contract").
53. It was the conclusion of both the Senate and Congressional hearings that any regulation
over private policing had to be left to the states, not the federal government. See, e.g., S. REP. No.
52-1280, at xv; H.R. REP. No. 52-2447, at xv.
54. See MORN, supra note 26, at 103 (noting that both investigations "were filled with anti-
Pinkerton rhetoric, but [in the end] gave only conservative recommendations"); MILTON LIPSON,
ON GUARD: THE BUSINESS OF PRIVATE SECURITY 163 (1975) ("In practice ... this archaic provision
and its tortured interpretations have been no barrier to the use of employees of Pinkerton's or
other similar organizations, both directly and indirectly by the United States government."). In
fact, the 1895 Pennsylvania state law originally intended to allow coal companies to deputize their
own police is being used today by homeowners' associations in the Pocono mountain area to estab-
lish their own private police forces. See Andrew Stark, Arresting Developments: When Police Power
Goes Private, AM. PROSPECT, Jan-Feb. 1999, at 41.
55. See STRIKEEREAKING SERVICES, S. REP. No. 76-6, pt. 1, at 13 (1893).
56. Act of Mar. 3, 1893, ch. 208, 27 Stat. 572, 591. The Pinkerton law, in slightly modified form,
remains good law. See 5 U.S.C. § 3108 (2000). See also MORN, Supra note 26, at 107 (noting that by
1899, twenty-four states and the District of Columbia prohibited armed guards from entering
their jurisdictions). Morn observes that the laws had little effect because the agencies could recruit
private police within states. See id. at 107-08.
57. See Weiss, supra note 25, at 103.
58. See, e.g., Burnett's Application, 5 Pa. D. 3 (1896) ("The private detective has so much power
for evil that I feel such appointments should only be made in cases of clear necessity."); Shelley's
Petition, 1 Pa. D. & C. 552, 553 (Dauphin Co. 1921) ("It is quite possible that ifa license were
granted to each and every applicant complying with the requirements of the act, to say the least, a
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After Homestead, Pinkerton's agency reduced its dependence upon strike
work as a source of revenue, focusing instead on combating professional jewelry and
banking theft, but newer agencies filled the needs of industry.59 Frank Morn, in his
historical account of the Pinkerton agency, describes the first two decades of the
twentieth century as a "golden age" of the private police.' Their prosperity was not
limited to strike work. The emergence of department stores that displayed goods on
open shelves, for instance, brought with it increased rates of shoplifting.6 In re-
sponse, store owners often banded together to establish protective groups, like the
Mutual Protective Association of New York, founded in 1919, which provided pri-
vate detectives to member stores and maintained a "rogues' gallery" of repeat of-
fenders.62 Other individual stores had long employed their own police, such as Mary
Plunkett, the "woman detective of New York City's Macy & Co."63 Other private po-
lice agents stopped petty theft, patrolled rail yards, served warrants, protected small
businesses, and even captured Army deserters for the federal government.'
community might be so overrun with detectives that they may become meddlesome and vexa-
tious."); cf Farley's Petition, 8 Pa. D. & C. 795, 796 (Phila. Co. 1927) ("The business of a private de-
tective has long been recognized as of such a nature that, for the public protection, it should be
restricted to persons whose characters are clean and above suspicion.").
59. See MORN,SUpia note 26, at 106, 167.
60. Id. at 169. In Philadelphia, for example, private detective agencies grew from 14 in 1900 to
37 in 1908, and in Chicago from 34 in 1910 to 58 in 1918. Id.
61. See KERRY SECRAVE, SHOPLIFTING: A SOCIAL HISTORY 18 (2001).
62. Jail Terms Reduce Xmas Shoplifting, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 1921, at 3 (describing activities of
Association); Stores Open War on Amateur Pilferers, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 1920, at El (describing
Association's clearing house); Shoplifters Plead Prices as Excuse, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 1920, at 23 (de-
scribing arrest of 52 shoplifters by agents of Association); Shoplifting Has Both Its "Pros" and Ama-
teurs, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 1924, at X9 (noting that Association's chief detective had been a
detective sergeant in the New York Police Department for 16 years); The Shoplifting Profession,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1930, at X1 7 ("In the 'Rogues Gallery' of store thieves-a collection of pho-
tographs furnished to all member organizations by the Stores' Mutual Protective Association-
there are pictures of 850 men and women who have at some time been convicted as shoplifters,
pickpockets, impostors or bad check passers.").
63. Mrs. Martins Dual Role, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 1895, at 8, see also Pilferingfr'om Stores, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 4, 1883, at 5 (observing that "hired detectives are ever on the lookout for thieves ....
but where one is caught a dozen will escape with their booty").
64. Glimpses of the variety of private police work appear in the case law of this period. See, e.g.,
Abbott v. Cooper, 23 P.2d 1027 (Cal. 1933) (residential patrol); Hallen v. Montgomery Ward & Co.,
281 N.W. 291 (Minn. 1938) (department store detective); Kobbe v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 216
N.W. 543 (Minn. 1927) (rail yard patrol); Newport v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 127 S.W.2d 687
(Mo. 1939) (store detective); In re Miller's Detective License, 17 Pa. D. 259 (Pa. Quar. Sess. 1908)
(capturing deserters); McClain v. Lawrence County, 14 Pa. Super. 273 (1900) (serving warrants);
Draughon v. Fox-Pelletier Corp., 126 S.W.2d 329 (Tenn. 1939) (residential patrol).
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By the 1930s, however, the continued involvement of private police in vio-
lent labor riots65 prompted yet another series of congressional investigations.'
On June 6, 1936, the Senate Committee on Education and Labor created a sub-
committee chaired by Senator Robert La Follette, Jr. (1905-25) to investigate
anew the role of private policing in strikes. 7 Not only had little apparently
changed since Homestead, the tactics of private police had become more violent.
Private police agencies had replaced their Winchesters with chemical munitions
and machine guns.68 Based upon testimony and records given by the five "most
prominent" private agencies involved in strike work,69 the La Follette Commit-
tee determined that strikebreaking services "accounted for a substantial por-
tion" of each firm's annual income.
70
Documented in the thousands of pages of the La Follette Committee's re-
ports, the use of private police to squelch labor organization was remarkable in
scope. No employer facing a labor crisis, it seemed, went without the aid of pri-
vate police assistance. Examples abounded. The West Point Manufacturing
Company, concerned about a planned strike in 1934, arranged with the local
sheriff to deputize more than one hundred men to police its textile mills dotted
along the west bank of the Chattahoochee River. 7' According to a resident of
Lanett, Alabama, West Point's private police blocked the only paved highway in
the area and "stop[ped] and search[ed] every car there. ' 72 In 1936 and 1937,
65. See Shot in Strike Battle, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1913, at N7I7 (describing violence between
strikers and private police in West Morrisville, N.J.); 3 Killed, 19 Shot, Town Set Afire, Ohio Militia
Out, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1916, at I (describing riot at Youngstown, Ohio); Rioting in Youngstown,
Troops on the Way, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1916, at 11.
66. Nor had the press or Congress been silent in the interim. See, e.g., Strike Inquiy Demanded
fiom Floor of House, CHRISTIAN ScI. MONIToR, Feb. 9, 1928, at 2 (noting the demands of Represen-
tative Fiorello LaGuardia and John Casey for investigation into labor conditions and of the pri-
vate police of coal operators).
67. See STRIKEBREAKING SERVICES, S. REP. No. 76-6, pt. 1, at 201 (1939). For an in-depth discus-
sion of the La Follette Committee's role in shaping views on civil liberties and workers' rights, see
JEROLD S. AUERBACH, LABOR AND LIBERTY: THE LA FOLLETTE COMMITTEE AND THE NEW DEAL
(1966).
68. See INDUSTRIAL MUNITIONS, S. REP. No. 76-6, pt. 3, at 184-90 (1939).
69. These were Pinkerton's National Detective Agency, Inc.; Railway Audit & Inspection Co.,
Inc.; Corporations Auxiliary Co., Inc.; Wm. J. Burns International Detective Agency, Inc.; and
National Corporation Service, Inc. S. REP. No. 76-6, pt. 1, at 19 (1939).
70. See id. at 20.
71. See id. at 42-44.
72. See id. at 45.
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members of the 350-person police force of the Republic Steel Corporation 73 used
"rough shadowing" (constant open surveillance sometimes rising to physical in-
timidation) against union leaders, organizers, and members in Youngstown and
in Canton, Ohio. 7' The Glenn E. Bodell Industrial Detectives company was one
of many private police agencies that received a "flourishing business" in provid-
ing undercover agents and guards to employers in the Salinas, California,
lettuce-packers' strike of 1936. 75 In Los Angeles, restaurant owners "followed
the reprehensible practice of hiring municipal policemen for strike duty" in a
1937 strike against the Brown Derby restaurant.
76
The Committee's conclusions were sweeping and condemnatory. The sole
purpose of these "private police systemisI ,'' 77 it concluded, was to "defend the in-
terests of the employer, whether an individual or corporation"; any "exercise [of]
the nonpartisan functions of guardian of the law" was "incidental. 7' The only
legitimate role that a privately funded police agency could assume was the "pro-
tection of life and property. ' 79 Whenever private police exceeded these activities
they "actledi only as an instrumentality of private economic policy."8 The La
Follette Committee drew a sharp contrast between the responsibilities and status
of public and private police:
Public police systems are established by law. They are paid
from public treasuries and are expected to be responsive to the re-
quirements of entire communities. They must perform their duties
impartially, without regard to the economic, racial, or religious sta-
tus or views of the individual members of the community. The final
73. See PRIVATE POLICE SYSTEMS, S. REP. No. 76-6, pt. 2, at 116 (1939).
74. THE "LITTLE STEEL" STRIKE AND CITIZENS' COMMITTEES, S. REP. No. 77-15 1, pt. 4, at 96-97
(1941).
75. See EMPLOYERS' ASSOCIATIONS AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING N CALIFORNIA, S. REP. No. 78-
398, pt. 3, at 1377 (1943).
76. See S. REP. No. 78-398, pt. 2, at 841 (1943).
77. The Committee used the term "private police" in a specific sense: the creation by corpora-
tions of their own private guard and espionage departments "to achieve the same results obtain-
able through the employment of industrial detective and strikebreaking agencies." See S. REP. No.
76-6, pt. 3, at 1 (1939). The Committee's views on these private police, however, are consistent with
their views on private policing work offered by the detective agencies and employers associations
they also studied.
78. See S. REP. No. 76-6, pt. 2, at 2 (1939).
79. Id.
80. Id.
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responsibility for the actions of public police systems rests in elected
representatives who are accountable to the electorate....
Private police systems, on the other hand, are created to meet
the economic needs and desires of private interests. They are paid
from private funds and act as the agents and servitors of their em-
ployers, who occupy their positions by virtue of their ownership of
property or as appointed agents of stockholders or owners....
Private police systems, therefore, cannot be viewed as agencies of
law and order.
81
As with the Homestead investigations, the reports of La Follette's commit-
tee resulted less in regulatory change than it did in reinforcing an unfavorable
image of private policing. As one consequence, the Pinkerton Agency formally
withdrew from all labor-related policing work in 1937.82
Contemporary criticism of private police agencies was not limited to their
involvement in labor strikes. Even the U.S. Supreme Court, in a 1937 criminal
case that depended largely on the testimony of private railroad police, took note
of their poor social standing: "Common experience teaches us that the testimony
of such witnesses, especially when uncorroborated, is open to the suspicion of
bias...."'
In their totality, the editorials, congressional testimony, public reports, and
newspaper articles from the post-Civil War period until the second World War
reveal an attitude of skepticism and antagonism toward private policing. While
the congressional investigation of 1939, like its predecessor, focuses only on the
role of private policing in labor unrest, each demonstrates deeply ambivalent at-
titudes regarding the proper role of privately paid police forces. No report or ed-
81. Id.
82. See MORN, supra note 26, at 188 (describing April 1937 general order number 105 of Pinker-
ton Agency ordering withdrawal).
83. District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 630-31 (1937); see also People v. Loris, 115
N.Y.S. 236,239 (N.Y. App. Div. 1909) ("And although Mr. Sawyer was neither an accomplice, nor an
odious witness, whose testimony was to be discredited, yet, in view of his employment as a detective,
his testimony was to be received 'with the greatest care and distrust,' las wasl said of a witness in a
like case.") (citation omitted); Gassenheimer v. United States, 26 App. D.C. 432,446 (D.C. Cir. 1906)
("Where one or more of the facts essential to conviction depend upon the evidence of detectives es-
pecially employed to procure evidence of the crime, it is eminently proper for the court to call atten-
tion lofthe jury] in some way to the possible bias or prejudice of such witnesses, as compared with
those who are apparently impartial and disinterested." (bracketed text in original)).
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itorial questioned the right to defend one's property or person," and yet there
existed "the grave problem of the responsible functions of public officials being
usurped by the agents of private corporations.18 5 The precise boundary between
self-defense and illegitimate force was not specified. Moreover, some observers,
including public police chiefs, conceded that private police were a necessary evil
to be tolerated because public officers could not be everywhere.'
84. See, e.g., 23 CONe. REc. 4225 (1892) (statement of Rep. Bryan) ("It is not fair to compel corpo-
rations to protect their property in this way, nor is it right that the safety and even life of the citizen
shall be imperiled by a private and irresponsible soldiery."); The Homestead Case, I Pa. D. 785,
789 (1892) ("The company had the undoubted right to protect its property .. "). In a 1955 case in-
volving a private police agency employed by the town of Kalamazoo, Michigan, the dissenting
judge, while denouncing the use of private police for public uses, stated:
The corporate deputy is no stranger to the law. His face has often appeared in the
courts. See Hearings before a Sub-committee of the Committee on Education and
Labor, United States Senate, pursuant to Senate Resolution 266, 74th Congress, 2d
Sess. (1936-1939). If he has any place in our scheme of government it is behind the
company fence, not on the public highways.
People v. Robinson, 74 N.W.2d 41,47 (Mich. 1955) (Smith, J., dissenting). But see State v. Kerner,
107 S.E. 222, 225 (N.C. 1921) ("[Tlhere are still localities, not necessary to mention, where great
corporations, under the guise of detective agents or private police, terrorize their employees by
armed force. If the people are forbidden to carry the only arms within their means, among them
pistols, they will be completely at the mercy of these great plutocratic organizations.").
85. PRIVATE POLICE SYSTEMS, S. REP. No. 76-6, pt. 2, at 215 (1939). The usurpation of public au-
thority had been raised as an issue before. Representative Owen Scott (1891-1893), for example, in
debating the 1892 resolution of the House to investigate private policing, argued:
It is commonly known in all parts of this country that the Pinkerton Detective
Agency has assumed the functions of a private army. In all States and at all times it
assumes to do that which is peculiarly the power of Government or of the State....
The liberties of large classes of people are threatened when individuals and corpora-
tions, without any sanction of law, are permitted to take and hold in custody with-
out warrant of law such as they may choose to arrest.
23 CONc. REC. 4224 (1892).
86. For instance, the 1939 Senate committee asked of Robert McClaughry, the chief of police for
Chicago, his opinion of private police to protect property:
Q. And so far as these men are concerned you would rather favor their employ-
ment? -A. Yes, sir. It is impossible to provide a police force large enough to meet all
the wants of business, and it is well enough to have an agency, reliable, to seek out
and furnish, for business men, only reliable watchers.
S. REP. No. 52-1280, at xi (1893).
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D. The Apparent Retreat of Private Policing
By the time of the Second World War, private police had not disappeared, but
they received little of the public hostility they had experienced before. 7 Those pri-
vate agencies that had once provided coal and steel companies with private police
now did so for defense contractors concerned both with petty theft and inter-
national, rather than domestic, espionage.88 Companies that entered into defense
contracts with the Department of Defense, like Pratt and Whitney Aircraft and
the Aluminum Company of America (ALCOA),89 were required to establish se-
curity plans that the Federal Bureau of Investigation helped to create.' At its
Cleveland, Ohio steel works, the Jones and Laughlin Corporation employed in
1943 seventy-two "plant protection employees" deputized by the city of Cleve-
land.9' In deciding a labor dispute involving Jones and Laughlin and its private
police force, the Supreme Court observed that "[i]t is a common practice in this
country for private watchmen or guards to be vested with the powers of police-
men, sheriffs or peace officers to protect the private property of their private em-
ployers.""2 Not all private police were stationed at industrial plants. Small agencies
continued to provide guards to businesses, and private detectives dredged up in-
criminating evidence for spurned spouses.93 After the war, some returning sol-
87. Shearing describes the 19 50s as a time when private policing "was considered an anachro-
nistic institution," Shearing, supra note 7, at 408, reprinted in MODERN POLICING, supra note 7, at
408, but considering the continued employment of private policing by defense contractors and
other employers this observation is overstated.
88. See, e.g., A.H. Raskin, G.M. Doubles Force to Curb Sabotage, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 1942, at 35
("To guard against spies and saboteurs in plants charged with responsibility for 10 per cent of the
national arms program, the General Motors Corporation has doubled its private police force in
the period since the Japanese assault on Pearl Harbor."); George R. Wackenhut, Business Espio-
nage, INDUS. SECURITY, Feb. 1966, at 4-8 (describing instances of industrial espionage and propos-
ing countermeasures). Wackenhut was the founder of The Wackenhut Corporation, a national
private police agency. See id. at 4.
89. These companies were also members of the board of directors for the American Society for
Industrial Security, the most prominent private policing professional organization, then and now.
See, e.g., INDUS. SECURITY, Feb. 1958, at 3.
90. See NAT'L ADVISORY COMM. REPORT, supra note 27, at 3 1.
91. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 331 U.S. 416,419-21 (1947).
92. Id. at 429.
93. See, e.g., Schauder v. Weiss, 88 N.Y.S.2d 317 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1949) (alleging a conspiracy be-
tween a detective agency and the plaintiff's husband to procure divorce from the plaintiff);
Agency for Investigation & Detection, Inc. v. Dep't of State of N.Y., 262 N.Y.S.2d 694 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1965) (describing a break-in by private detectives to obtain evidence in a divorce case).
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diers even made use of the Servicemen's Readjustment Act to finance and to
"establish police services outside the realm of public police forces."94 No further
controversies on the scale of Homestead, however, surfaced.
(One notable exception was the employment in 1967 of the Wackenhut Cor-
poration by then-Florida Governor Claude R. Kirk, Jr., to "drive organized
crime out of [Florida]."95 During its four month existence, Wackenhut's group
arrested twenty-three people and opened five hundred investigations. While the
Republican Kirk counted among the group's successes the elimination of a
$780,000-a-year narcotics operation, 96 one report suggested that the majority of
those investigated by the Wackenhut police were Democratic state officials.
7
After vocal opposition by the Florida public police and several state legislators,
Kirk abolished his private police force, and requested instead $1.5 million from
the state legislature to establish a special state police force. 98)
In the meantime, public policing had been undergoing its own changes. Be-
ginning in the Progressive era, reformers99 introduced into these quasi-military
bureaucracies' 0 legalistic and professional norms.' Many police chiefs gained
tenure and thereby acquired greater freedom from the influence of local poli-
tics.0 2 Newly established police academies offered formal training to recruits.0 3
No less important was the introduction of technological advances-the patrol
car, the two-way radio, and the telephone (and later the computer)-that trans-
94. Vets Launch Security Services, POLICE CHIEFS NEws, June 1947, at 24.
95. Martin Waldron, Florida'S Governor Sets Up Private Police Force, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1967, at
56; Martin Waldron, Private Police Scored, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1967, at 28.
96. Kirk Says Private Police Broke Up Narcotics Ring, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1967, at 32.
97. Martin Waldron, Florida Aroused by "War" on Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1967, at 22.
98. Martin Waldron, Gov. KirkAgrees to Give Up His Private Police, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 1967, at
1. For a discussion of the legality of private police employment by a state governor, see generally
Tamar Frankel, The Governor's Private Eyes, 49 B.U. L. REV. 627 (1969).
99. Individuals like August Vollmer and his disciple, O.W. Wilson, were especially influential.
See GENE E. CARTE & ELAINE H. CARTE, POLICE REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES: THE ERA OF
AUGUST VOLLMER, 1905-1932, at 2-3 (1975); SAMUEL WALKER, A CRITICAL HISTORY OF POLICE RE-
FORM 141-45, 161-63 (1977).
100. Reiss refers to nineteenth-century police organizations as "quasi-militaristic," by which he
means "rationalized hierarchical authority [produced] by adopting the basic military form of hier-
archical organization." Reiss, supra note 15, at 89, reprinted in MODERN POLICINC, supra note 7, at
89.
101. For representative accounts of these reforms, see, e.g., ROBERT M. FOCELSON, BIG-CITY Po-
LICE 93-116 (1977); WALKERsupra note 99, at 109-37.
102. See Reiss, supra note 15, at 57, reprinted in MODERN POLIcIN,supra note 7, at 57.
103. WALKER,SUpra note 12, at 161-64.
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formed patrol work by allowing quick responses to citizen complaints by means
of a centralized dispatch) 4 A new sociology of the police emerged as well, but it
omitted study of the private police.' 5
II. PRIVATE POLICE AS PARTNERS
A. Federal Studies of Private Policing
If at mid-century the private police appeared to be experiencing a modest
decline (both in demand and employment), then new research in the 1970s
raised questions about the accuracy of that view and the likely future for private
police. Beginning in the 1970s, the Department of Justice sponsored a series of
reports on private policing °6 that were noteworthy in two respects. As an empir-
ical matter, it turned out that private policing had not only continued to prosper
in the second half of the twentieth century, but was now outpacing the public po-
lice in employment and expenditure. Perhaps more importantly, these reports
first encourage and then display a change in attitude by public police chiefs, law-
makers, and other public officials about private policing, and provide a vocabu-
lary to describe that shift. Rather than pose a threat to public police, private
police, according to these reports, could serve as the public sector's new partner.
The reports first show in plain numbers how private policing had grown,
unnoticed, at a dramatic rate in the 1960s and 1970s. 117 The Hallcrest Report of
104. Id. at 136-37.
105. See Maureen Cain, Trends in the Sociology of Police Work, INT'L J. Soc. L., May 1979, at 143,
144-45. "Nobody questioned what 'the police' meant. Thus private police forces, citizen protec-
tion groups, and other government policing bodies, were ignored." Id. at 145.
106. The principal reports include: JAMES S. KAKALIK & SORREL WILDHORN, PRIVATE POLICE IN
THE UNITED STATES: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (1971); JAMES S. KAKALIK & SORREL WILD-
HORN, THE PRIVATE POLICE INDUSTRY: ITS NATURE AND EXTENT (1971); JAMES S. KAKALIK & SORREL
WILDHORN, CURRENT REGULATION OF PRIVATE POLICE: REGULATORY AGENCY EXPERIENCE AND
VIEWS (1971); JAMES S. KAKALIK & SORREL WILDHORN, THE LAW AND PRIVATE POLICE (1971);
JAMES S. KAKALIK & SORREL WILDHORN, SPECIAL-PURPOSE PUBLIC POLICE (1971) [the foregoing
five reports are a series hereinafter collectively referred to as the RAND REPORT in the text, but re-
ferred to individually in the footnotes]; NAT'L ADVISORY COMM. REPORT, SUpra note 27; WILLIAM
C. CUNNINGHAM & TODD H. TAYLOR, CRIME AND PROTECTION IN AMERICA: A STUDY OF PRIVATE
SECURITY AND LAW ENFORCEMENT RESOURCES AND RELATIONSHIPS (Daniel Ford ed., 1985);
WILLIAM C. CUNNINGHAM, JOHN J. STRAUCHS & CLIFFORD W. VAN METER, PRIVATE SECURITY
TRENDS, 1970-2000: THE HALLCREST REPORT 11 (1990) [hereinafter HALLCREST REPORTI.
107. See generally Joh,supra note 4, at 67-71 (from which portions of this discussion are drawn).
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1990, commissioned by the Department of Justice, records not only this develop-
ment, but also predicts that private police employment would continue to out-
pace that of public police well into the future, contradicting the predictions of a
1971 study issued by the Rand Corporation.18 According to the authors of the
Hallcrest Report, private police employees would outnumber public police by a
ratio of 2.8:1 by the year 2000.109
While the Rand Report was wrong on the pace of private police growth, it
was probably the first major national study of several to suggest that private po-
lice could serve as a resource for public policing.110 The Report assumes explic-
itly that private police, who perform a variety of legitimate security roles, "fill a
perceived need and provide clear social benefits to their consumers and to the
general public.""1. It also seeks to upend the conventional wisdom that policing
is necessarily a government function." 2 Policing, according to the Report's au-
thors, is a "service" that can be assumed either by public or private agencies."'
While private police-some 289,000 guards and investigators in 1969-are pri-
marily "concerned with private interests," including the "prevention and detec-
tion of crime on private property and the gathering of information for private
purposes," the Rand Report nevertheless contends that most private policing is
108. The comparison concerns only private guards, but the difference between the two estimates
is nevertheless noteworthy. Compare HALLCREST REPORT, sUpra note 106, at 229, with X RAND RE-
PORT, supra note 106, at 17 ("By 1975, BLS projections indicate that there will be fewer combined
private security workers and public guards than there will be public police"). By "public guard,"
the report refers to guards employed in the public sector without "peace officer" status. RAND RE-
PORT, supra note 106, at 17.
109. See HALLCREST RETORT,supra note 106, at 229. According to the Report-which remains the
most recent reliable source of figures-as of 1990, there were about 520,000 contract guards,
528,000 proprietary security personnel (personnel employed directly by a client of private policing
services), 70,000 private investigators, and 2,900 "security engineers" ("employees deriving their
primary income from [securityl consultation fees"). Id. at 185-88.
110. Shearing, supra note 7, at 409, reprinted in MODERN POLICING, Supra note 7, at 409 ("In retro-
spect, RAND's report can be identified as one of the earliest indications of the shift in political
consciousness that has promoted the privatization of a whole range of services previously seen as
fundamentally public." (citations omitted)).
111. KAKALIK & WiLDHORN, PRIVATE POLICE IN THE UNITED STATES, Supra note 106, at 24; seealo
INST. FOR LOCAL SELF Gov'T, PRIVATE SECURITY AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 101 (1974) (accepting the
"assumption" that "private security provides social benefits to the general community as well as to
the users of security services").
112. This challenged conventional research on the police that drew from Max Weber's definition
of the state as having a monopoly over the legitimate use of force. MAX WEBER, POLITICS As A VOCA-
TION 2 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills trans., Fortress Press 1965) (1919); Joh, supra note 4, at 69.
113. KAKALIK & WILDHORN, PRIVATE POLICE IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 106, at 17.
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"complementary" to public policing." 4 The problems within private policing
identified in the Report-such as the unnecessary use of force and dishonest
business practices-are not fundamental faults inherent to private policing, but
technical issues amenable to improved regulation."
l 5
Private police, in the view supported by the Rand Report, could serve as
supplements, or "junior partners," to the public police, a shift in perspective ac-
complished by "blurring the line between 'self-defense' and peacekeeping."
' 6
Thus, individual examples of private protection, in the aggregate, contribute to
general public safety. Similarly, a 1974 study, conducted by the Institute for
Local Self Government (ILSF) and sponsored by California's Council of Crimi-
nal justice, states that the private police
perform work that the regular police cannot or will not perform.
The public police typically cannot be spared to prevent or to inves-
tigate certain suspected but unauthenticated crimes such as em-
ployee pilferage and, by law, they must refrain from crime
prevention activities on private property unless asked to do so by
the owner in specific instances.'
17
In this view, private police do not usurp public authority, but provide much-
needed aid to the public police.
Later studies took the additional step of suggesting that private police ought
to be considered equal partners with the public police, rather than subordinates
supplying a complementary service. The 1990 Hallcrest Report, for instance,
identifies the "coproduction of security" as a goal to be met together by "public
114. Id. at 11, 16, 18. A 1974 study of private policing in California also describes the roles of pub-
lic and private as "complementary [rather than] competitive." INST. FOR LOCAL SELF GOV'T,Supra
note 11l, at 86;seealso NAT'L ADVISORY COMM. REPORT,SUpra note 27, at 19 (stating that "lildeally,
public law enforcement and private security agencies should work closely together, because their
respective roles are complementary in the effort to control crime. Indeed, the magnitude of the
Nation's crime problem should preclude any form of competition between the two.").
115. KAKALIK & WILDHORN, PRIVATE POLICE IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 106, at viii-ix.
116. Shearing,supra note 7, at 411, reprintedin MODERN POLICINC,SUpra note 7, at 411. Commen-
tators have been similarly concerned about the blurring of defensive and offensive work per-
formed by private military contractors in U.S.-occupied Iraq. See also David Barstow, Security
Companies: Shadow Soldiers in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19,2004, at Al (noting that, according to se-
curity company executives, the line between permitted defensive work and prohibited combative
work is becoming "blurred").
117. See INST. FOR LOCAL SELF Gov'T, supra note 111, at 88.
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law enforcement, private security, and citizens.""' What was clear by 1990-
that private police outnumbered public police-was not an occasion for alarm,
according to the Report's authors, but an opportunity for the "realignment of
roles and greater cooperation between the public and private sectors.'. 9 Conse-
quently, the "traditional approach" of public police "working independently of
citizens and businesses 1would have tof change."' 121 Public police would not only
have to work more with these groups, but also reinvent themselves as "brokers"
of security resources.12 ' Through these redefinitions, these reports challenged
the premise that "policing" was primarily a government service. 12'
B. Changing Public Police Attitudes
The vocabulary of partnership also found support in the public police com-
munity, but not without initial resistance. The California Institute for Local Self
Government, for example, found in its 1974 survey of 158 public police and sher-
iff's departments considerable reluctance about creating formal partnerships
with private police agencies, chiefly because of concerns about the quality of pri-
vate police employees. 23 Similarly, a 1971 national survey reported that 40 per-
cent of public police described their relationship with private security as only
"fair" and 5 percent as "poor." 124
118. HALLCREST REPORT, SUpra note 106, at 312.
119. Id. at 319.
120. Id. While the Report makes reference both to for-profit policing and to volunteer policing
here, most of the Report focuses on private policing as it is defined here.
121. Id. at 320.
122. See PRIVATE SECURITY ADVISORY COUNCIL, LAW ENFORCEMENT AND PRIVATE SECURITY
SOURCES AND AREAS OF CONFLICT AND STRATEGIES FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION 23 (1977) ("Private
security and law enforcement, through a combined effort, must develop ways to enhance the de-
livery of services to clients and to the public.").
123. INST. FOR LOCALSELF GOv'T,supra note 111, at 10, 98; NAT'L ADVISORY COMM. REPORT,SUpra
note 27, at 20 (citing qualification of private security personnel as a "substantive barrier to effective
interaction"); PRIVATE SECURITY ADVISORY COUNCIL, supra note 122, at 2 (reporting that 55% of
public police surveyed viewed private police as "incompetent").
124. See Richard Post, Relations with Private Police Services, POLICE CHIEF, Mar. 1971, at 54-56;
Thomas M. Scott & Marlys McPherson, The Development of the Private Sector of the Criminal Jus-
tice System, 6 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 267, 282 (1971) ("Most law enforcement officers interviewed [in a
Minnesota study] indicated that their attitudes toward the private police system are more positive
at best, to ambivalent at least, while no one interviewed indicated that he had favorable attitudes
toward and cooperative relationships with all private agents.").
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Advocates of partnership, like the Private Security Advisory Council estab-
lished by the Department of justice in 1977, attributed suspicion of the public
police toward private police to "role conflict.' 12 In the Council's view, the blame
for role conflict rested squarely with the public police, who were preoccupied
with perceived threats to their status, and who failed to see that private and pub-
lic police were "both directed toward protective functions in society."'
2 6
Public police chiefs disposed toward partnerships took two approaches to
overcome these suspicions. Some, like Michael Shanahan, a "private sector liai-
son" for the International Association of Chiefs of Police, and police chief of the
University of Washington, suggested that public police should not fight the in-
evitable dominance of private policing in controlling crime: "The preferences of
public law enforcement officials are no longer a controlling factor in these devel-
opments."'127 Others emphasized the positive effects of enhancing public police
power through public-private alliances, by tapping formerly unavailable re-
sources (increased patrols), and by public police incorporation of private sector
skills ("management by objectives"). 28 According to one Los Angeles Police De-
partment sergeant, "It's not that [the public police arel lazy, there aren't enough
of us to go around."' 29 Similarly, in the view of Major Paul Fitzgerald, of the
Providence, Rhode Island Police, partnerships present a "win-win situation for
all of us."'3 ° Through a reinterpretation of their role and capabilities, many of
the threats once associated with the private police had been neutralized.
C. The Advocacy of Partnerships
By the end of the 1990s, the agenda for public police reform included public-
private partnerships. Policymakers actively encouraged their creation. A 2000 re-
125. PRIVATE SECURITY ADVISORY COUNCIL, supra note 122, at 4.
126. See id. at 4-6; Jack R. Greene et al., Merging Public and Private Security for Collective Benefit:
Philadelphia's Center City District, AM. J. OF POLICE, Issue 2 1995, at 3, 5 (attributing conflict to mis-
understanding and competition between the two).
127. Michael G. Shanahan, Private Enterprise and the Public Police: The Professionalizing Effects of
a New Partnership, in POLICE LEADERSHIP IN AMERICA: CRISIS AND OPPORTUNITY 449, 449 (William
A. Geller ed., 1985); Ralph Blumenthal, Private Guards Cooperate in Public Policing, N.Y. TIMES,
July 13, 1993, at BI (reporting that public police say that "there seems little choice but to join
forces" with private police).
128. See, e.g., Shanahan,supra note 127, at 455 ("On the other side, law enforcement officials will
be exposed to a higher degree of organizational sophistication.").
129. Nina Munk, Rent-a-Cops, FORBES, Oct. 10, 1994, at 104, 106.
130. Richard C. Dujardin, City Police Team up with Private Security Personnel, PROVIDENCE J.-
BULL., Dec. 9,2003, at C-01.
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port published by the Department of Justice, "Operation Cooperation," counts
sixty cooperative programs throughout the country, and suggests that "Injo city or
metropolitan area should be without at least one.'' These programs vary in size
and objectives, ranging from the thirty members of the Northeast Florida Law
Enforcement and Private Security Council that share information on retail theft,
to the one thousand-member New York Area Police/Private Security Liaison that
established a business crime squad in midtown Manhattan.3 : The private mem-
bers of these alliances vary as well. Some are contract security companies and cor-
porate police departments; others are private corporations themselves (that
contract with private police agencies or employ their own).'33 Whatever their
identity, private members all share the same goals of promoting partnership with
public police departments.'34 Some examples are discussed below.
1. Joint Investigations
For some public police departments, the increased acceptability of partnerships
has led to their greater willingness to enter into joint investigations with private po-
lice, both by lending public personnel, as well as by providing administrative and
technical resources. Gary Marx discusses one such example: a sting conducted by
the FBI and IBM that targeted the theft of technological trade secrets. 3 '
The investigation began when a former employee informed IBM that he
had been approached by the Hitachi Corporation about obtaining confidential
computer information.'36 After meeting with IBM security officers, the em-
131. INST. FOR LAW AND JUSTICE & HALLCREST Div. OF ScI. APPLICATIONS INT'L CORP., DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, OPERATION COOPERATION: GUIDELINES FOR PARTNERSHIPS BETWEEN LAW ENFORCEMENT
AND PRIVATE SECURITY ORGANIZATIONS 1, 3 (2000) [hereinafter OPERATION COOPERATION I.
132. Id. at 7-8; Anthony M. Voelker, NYPDs APPL Program: A New Partnership, FBI L. EN-
FORCEMENT BULL., Feb. 1991, at 1, 2; see generally S. Woodruff Bentley,An Alliance is Born, SECU-
RITY MGMT., Oct. 1997, at 77 (describing Virginia Police and Private Security Alliance). For a
review of similar partnerships in Canada, see RIGAKOS,supra note 35, at 42.
133. See generally David R. Green,Joining Forces Against Crime, SECURITY MGMT., May 1998, at
95 (describing The Business/Law Enforcement Alliance in California, which was established in
1994 and consists of private corporations and city, county, state, and federal law enforcement
agencies).
134. Thus, the Operation Cooperation report lists among its examples both kinds of partnerships
referred to here. INST. FOR LAW AND JUSTICE & HALLCREST Div. oF ScI. APPLICATIONS INT'L CORP.,
supra note 131, at 2-4.
135. Gary T. Marx, The Interweaving of Public and Private Police in Undercover Work, in PRIVATE
POLICING 172, 173 (Clifford D. Shearing & Philip C. Stenningeds., 1987).
136. Much of this account is taken from Gary T. Marx. Id. at 173-74.
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ployee introduced Hitachi officials to members of"Glenmar Associates," a ficti-
tious consulting firm created by IBM and the FBI (which had been informed
later of the proposed corporate espionage) that offered to sell IBM secrets to Hi-
tachi. As a result of their joint undercover work, criminal charges were eventu-
ally filed against twenty-one people in 1982, including senior officials at Hitachi
and at the Mitsubishi Electric Corporation. The defendants were accused of,
among other things, paying $648,000 to an undercover FBI agent in exchange
for the stolen information. William H. Webster, then-director of the FBI,
praised IBM "for the excellent assistance rendered during this investigation."
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2. Information-Sharing Networks
Many partnerships also provide a formal means to share information on
crime patterns and suspects. While we know little about the history of these re-
lationships, former public police officials in the private sector probably have long
relied on their public police contacts for information.'38 What is different about
contemporary partnerships is their formal, public nature; these partnerships
exist with the imprimatur of the public police department's official face, and by
extension, the approval of a city, a state, or the federal government.
These groups typically have three purposes. First, they share from their re-
spective departments information on crime patterns, suspects,' 39 and identifica-
tion of "criminogenic ' situations such as demonstrations. 4' Second, many
137. Jeff Gerth, Japanese Executives Charged in LB.M. Theft Case, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 1982, at
Al, D6.
138. See, e.g., MORN,Supra note 26, at 170 (noting that ex-Secret Service agents formed their own
detective agencies after retirement in the nineteenth century).
139. The practice of some private police departments to keep their own suspect files dates back to
the Pinkerton agency's maintenance of a "I riogues gallerly]." Id. at 122.
140. "Criminogenic" situations are crime-causing ones. See generally LAWRENCE W. SHERMAN ET
AL., PREVENTING CRIME: WHAT WORKS, WHAT DOESN'T, WHAT'S PROMISING 2-3 (1997),availableat
http://www.ncjrs.org/works/. Cf. David Garland, 'Governmentality' and the Problem of Crime:
Foucault, Criminology, Sociology, I THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 173, 187 (1997) (explaining that
criminogenic situations, "hot spots of crime," present a new problem in controlling crime).
141. See, e.g., Dujardin,supra note 130, at C-01 (reporting Providence police chief as saying that
"the most powerful element in [its] new partnership ... is the sharing of information between pri-
vate and public agencies"); Christopher Lee, Police Ask Security Guards for Aid in Crime Crack-
down, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 6, 1997, at 25A (quoting Dallas police chief as describing its
public-private partnership as "really about information exchange"); Voelker, supra note 132, at 2
(describing these activities with respect to the APPL partnership); Terence J. Mangan & Michael
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partnerships, such as the Business/Law Enforcement Alliance of California, tar-
get particular categories of crime such as check fraud that concern their private
members and ask the public police members of the partnership for assistance.
4 2
Finally, regular meetings and personal contacts among private police executives
and public police representatives circulate tokens of a common policing culture:
"informal networks, similar tasks, and the exchange of personnel."'43
In one example, the shipping company FedEx recently convinced legislators
in Tennessee, where it is headquartered, to amend state law so that FedEx could
employ its own, ten-person sworn police force. 4 This means that FedEx police
may now "investigate all types of crimes, request search warrants and make ar-
rests anywhere in the state."' 45 Although FedEx had long employed its own pri-
vate police force, 6 the state's conferral of peace officer status on the FedEx
police department allows the company to occupy a seat on a regional task force
run by the FBI. 14 7 Membership on the task force permits FedEx to receive "more
sensitive and specific information regarding terrorist threats than businesses
usually receive."
' 148
Some partnerships also operate in virtual space. After the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, the perceived vulnerability of the nation's telephone lines,
gas pipelines, and transport systems-nearly all of which are privately owned-
G. Shanahan, Public Law Enforcement/Private Security: A New Partnership?, FBI L. ENFORCEMENT
BULL., Jan. 1990, at 18,21:
[C]ooperation between public law enforcement and private security must continue
and, if there is one area where public law enforcement and private security have
worked cooperatively for joint advantage, it has been in the area of collection and
dissemination of records. The ability of both public law enforcement and private se-
curity to amass large amounts of personal data about people's personal histories, em-
ployment records, etc., poses serious liability problems during an era that has seen
severe restrictions placed on the use and release of such data.
142. The BLEA brought public police attention and support to an initiative by banks that re-
quired persons without accounts in a particular bank to place an inkless fingerprint on their
checks before being allowed to cash them. Green, supra note 133, at 96-97.
143. Marx, supra note 135, at 182.
144. Woody Baird, FedEx Guards Packages, Planes with Private Police, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Feb.
28, 2004, at C2.
145. Gary Fields, FedEx Takes Direct Approach to Terrorism: Carrier Sets up Its Own Police Force,
Gaining Seat on Regional Task Force Overseen by FBI, WALL ST. J., Oct. 9, 2003, at A4.
146. See id. ("Air carriers generally have a good relationship with the FBI [anyway] because
many of the airlines' security personnel are former agents.").
147. Baird,supra note 144, at C2.
148. Fields, supra note 145, at A4.
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prompted increased calls for private-public partnerships.'49 These concerns have
led to the foundation of groups such as the 1,800 member InfraGuard network,
permitting member corporations to receive information on threats to bridges
and other parts of the national infrastructure before it is available to the general
public. 
s5
Despite the fact that public agencies are involved in these alliances, there is
no public regulation over the partnerships themselves. Nor are there any re-
quirements that these partnerships measure the impact or success of their joint
ventures. As a result, it will be nearly impossible, absent voluntary disclosure, to
evaluate these emerging organizations.
3. Special Tax-assessment Districts
Beginning in the 197 0s, cities like New York, Philadelphia, St. Louis, and Los
Angeles experimented with a new form of partnership in special tax-assessment
districts, sometimes referred to as business improvement districts.' 5' In these spe-
cial districts, private property owners in physical proximity to one another (and
typically in urban commercial areas)'5 2 establish a formal association and agree to
tax themselves, in excess of their normal obligations, to pay for additional collective
services such as private police and sanitation workers.' 53 The property owners first
pay the fees to the city, which then returns the money to the special district to pay
for the increased services. By 1999, there were 1,200 business improvement districts
in North America, with 150 to 200 in California and 34 in New York City alone.
154
149. See Ralph Shrader & James Woolsey, Comment: Business Must Be Involved in Security Plan-
ning, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2004, at 15 (advocating partnerships). Woolsey is the former director of
the Central Intelligence Agency.
150. See Profile: Private Companies Being Warned of Possible Terrorist Threats Before Its Made Pub-
lic (Minnesota Public Radio: Marketplace broadcast Nov. 6, 2001); Critical Infrastructure Protec-
tion: Hearing Before S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 106th Cong. (2001) (statement of Jamie S.
Gorelick, Vice Chair, Fannie Mae).
151. See, e.g., Joseph Mokwa & Terrence W. Stoehner, Private Security Arches over St. Louis, SECU-
RITY MCMT., Sept. 1995, at 94 (describing operation of St. Louis's business improvement district
(BID)).
152. Not all specially taxed districts include primarily commercial property owners. See, e.g.,
JAMES F. PASTOR, THE PRIVATIZATION OF POLICE IN AMERICA: AN ANALYSIS AND CASE STUDY 101-
63 (2003) (conducting empirical study of Marquette Park Special Services Area, a special tax-
assessment district for a residential neighborhood in Chicago).
153. See Marla Dickerson, Suit Challenges Private Security Controls, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1999, at
Cl.
154. Id.; Mark S. Davies, Business Improvement Districts, 52 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMp. L. 187,
192 (1997) (counting thirty-four BIDS as of 1996).
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An example of one such partnership is the special Center City District
(CCD) in Philadelphia, established in 1991.155 The 2,087 property owners within
the District, representing the city's highest concentration of hotels, stores, banks,
and office buildings, pay a 5 percent property tax surcharge. This pays for the
employment of forty-five to fifty private patrol officers. The CCD private po-
lice, who carry no weapons and who do not possess peace officer powers, patrol
the district in "beats." The Philadelphia Police Department receives no special
funds from the District but nevertheless has contributed sixty additional public
officer posts to the District. Both groups of police work out of the same police
substation located within the district. Thomas Seamon, deputy police commis-
sioner of the Philadelphia Police Department, credited this "merging of public
police and private security" with a 6-percent decrease in crime in a twelve-
month period.
15 6
III. THE CHANGED DISCOURSE ON PRIVATE POLICING
By the end of the twentieth century, private policing had gained new re-
spectability from the government and the public police. To be sure, there re-
mained dissenting views that were less sanguine about the role of private
policing. In 1971, the Berkeley Center for Research and Justice raised doubts
that private police would "provide any lasting solution to the fear and insecurity
that have come to dominate U.S. cities," and further suggested that security
guard employment could only exacerbate already strained urban race rela-
tions. 57 Civil liberties groups like the American Civil Liberties Union have con-
sistently questioned the desirability of private police employment from their use
in strikebreaking to the present day.'58 And, their popularity notwithstanding, a
number of business improvement districts have faced lawsuits accusing their
155. See Thomas M. Seamon, Private Forces for Public Good, SECURITY MGMT., Sept. 1995, at 92;
Greene et al.,supra note 126, at 13-15.
156. Seamon,supra note 155, at 92.
157. CTR. FOR RESEARCH ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE IRON FIST ANU THE VELVET GLOVE 157
(1977).
158. See Opposes Private Police, N. Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 1930, at 13 (reporting state-wide campaign
in Pennsylvania by the ACLU to "abolish the private police system"); Ford Police in Rackets, Accu-
sation, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 11, 1932, at 2 (describing letter from ACLU to Henry Ford alleging its
private police "connected with gangsters and racketeers"); Ralph Blumenthal, Private Guards Co-
operate in Public Policing, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 1993, at B1 (citing New York Civil Liberties Union
as questioning accountability of private police).
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private police forces of illegal conduct, including the alleged harassment of the
homeless.' 
59
Yet the shift in conventional wisdom about private policing was undeniable.
What had changed was the balance of public views. Conspicuously missing from
the debate were any of the fundamental criticisms of private policing character-
ized by the La Follette or Homestead investigations." ° Absent were questions
about the "delegation of the sovereign power of the State to private hands."' 6' In
contemporary discussions, private police do not by their very nature threaten
civil liberties or challenge the right (or duty) of the state to provide policing ser-
vices. Through their exhortations and reinterpretations, the reports that first ap-
peared in the 1970s played an important role in relegating the perception of
opprobrious conduct by private police to the past.
That privately paid protection of life and property could enhance the pro-
tection provided by the state had been suggested even during the most intense
periods of criticism against the private police in the 1890s and 1930s.162 So why
did the partnership model, building upon that long-standing argument, hold
such appeal in the last quarter of the twentieth century? One reason may be
found in a larger contemporary debate over the responsibility and capability of
government to control crime: A crisis in what David Garland terms the "myth
of sovereign crime control" 6--the implicit promise of modern governments
for "control of crime and the protection of citizens.""
159. See Dickerson, supra note 153 (describing class action lawsuit against three security compa-
nies and BIDs employing them); Terry Pristin, For Improvement Districts, Restored Alliance with
City, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 18, 2002, at Bl, B3 (describing the alleged assault of homeless people at the
Grand Central Partnership in 1995).
160. See Shearing,supra note 7, at 419,reprinted in MODERN POLICNC, supra note 7, at 419.
161. William T. Martin, Editorial, Industrial Police Stir Pennsylvania, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1931, at
58.
162. See, e.g., Bankers' Private Police, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 1900, at 11 ("Banks, bankers, and trust
companies could not with safety wholly depend on the uniformed police and the Headquarters
and precinct Detective Sergeants, detective officers, and special officers for protection against the
'dangerous classes.'").
163. David Garland, The Limits of the Sovereign State: Strategies of Crime Control in Contemporary
Society, 36 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 445,448 (1996);see also ADAM CRAWFORD, THE LOCAL GOVERNANCE
OF CRIME 23-24 (1997) (discussing the development of the public monopoly over crime control).
164. Garland, supra note 163, at 448; see also CRAWFORD, supra note 163, at 23 ("[Beginning in the
19th century, tihe responsibility for policing was firmly located in the state.... Communities and
the public were defined as recipients of a service. This conception has remained dominant, and
was supported and extended by the establishment of the welfare state in the twentieth century.").
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The second half of the twentieth century saw, as I have discussed elsewhere,'65
many Western democracies caught in a dilemma. Faced with persistently high
crime rates, public officials responsible for criminal law policies and expenditures
saw the need to qualify a fundamental and implicit promise of modern govern-
ment: to guarantee safety and security to its citizens. That qualification took two
approaches. One took the form of careful but deliberate statements that govern-
ment could not be expected alone to guarantee protection from crime."' Another
was the transformation of a longstanding skepticism toward private policing into
public approval and the encouragement of partnerships.
These public-private partnerships, now unquestionably an important crime
control approach in the United States, rest upon assumptions whose implica-
tions have not yet been fully explored. First, it is presumed that partnerships
share common objectives. 6 7 Private police agencies, however, can play a signifi-
cant role in shaping the definition and scope of the projects they wish to target
with public aid.
Consider the advocacy of the International AntiCounterfeiting Coalition,
Inc. (IACC), an organization representing "exclusively the interests of compa-
nies concerned with IP I intellectual property] enforcement,"'68 which presented
testimony to the International Relations Committee of the House of Represen-
tatives. Concerned that product counterfeiting and piracy constituted "very low
law enforcement priorities after September 11,2001," IACC president Timothy
Trainer argued that counterfeiting often provided sources of funding to terror-
ists.'69 In the organization's view, public support for the IACC's goals of policing
counterfeit jeans and handbags will "aid in the battle against terrorism and also
165. Joh,supra note 4, at 68.
166. See id. (citing pronouncements by former director of National Institute of Justice and the
British Home Office).
167. See, e.g., Pending Crime Bill: Hearing on H.R. 2641, H.R. 2803, and H.R. 2996 Before H.
Comm. on theJudiciay, 104th Cong. (1996) (statement of Rep. Bill McCollum, Chairman, H. Sub-
comm. on the Judiciary) (stating that with regard to proposed bill on partnerships, "[plublic law
enforcement and the private security industry work toward the same goals").
168. INT'L ANTICOUNTERFEITING COALITION, INC., SUBMISSION TO THE UNITED STATES TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE: SPECIAL 301 RECOMMENDATIONS 2 (2005), available at http://www.iacc.org/2005-
301.pdf.
169. Counteifeited Goods Funding Terrorism: Hearing Before the H. Int'l Relations Comm., 108th
Cong. (2003) (statement of Timothy P. Trainer, President, Int'l AntiCounterfeiting Coalition,
Inc.).
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enhance our national economic security. ' '1 7' By redefining its own interests and
persuading lawmakers that these interests are public ones, the IACC presented
a case for public-private pursuit of the "public interest." Because public re-
sources are finite, the characterization of some private police objectives as "pub-
lic" ones ultimately means shifting attention and resources away from some
concerns and toward others. While some substantive goals of private and public
police may coincide, it would surely be a mistake to characterize their goals as
identical.
171
Another assumption underlying these partnerships is that mutual benefit ac-
crues to the "communities" served by private and public forces. 72 Private policing,
in the view of some of its advocates, represents true community policing: safety
and protection on demand. 73 This characterization, however, obscures what can
be very different instantiations of community. What is more, such proposals ig-
nore the fact that community itself-its membership and very definition-is
often a contested and fluid concept. A fundamental premise of public policing is
"policing by consent"-accountability to the very people for whom the police pro-
vide protection. Privately policed "communities" often have a sponsor (the em-
ployer) distinct from the policed group (shoppers, students, office workers). To be
sure, to the extent that a private policing community incorporates legalistic values,
the policed group will be able to funnel complaints and opinions ihat will affect
170. See INT'L ANTICOUNTERFEITING COALITION, INC., THE NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF INTER-
NATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY THEFT: ECONOMIC HARM, THREATS TO THE PUBLIC HEALTH
AND SAFETY, AND LINKS TO ORGANIZED CRIME AND TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS 36 (2005), http.//
www.iacc.org/WhitePaper.pdf. Prominently featured in this "white paper" on terrorism and
counterfeiting are reports that those who bombed the World Trade Center in 1993 had financed
their activities with counterfeit textile sales from a store in New York City. See id. at 20 (citing
news articles).
171. Some courts have refused to recognize private police as state actors precisely for this reason.
See, e.g., Waters v. State, 575 A.2d 1244, 1247 (Md. 1990) (observing that the "private status lof se-
curity guards] is not altered because their interest in protecting property coincides with the pub-
lic's interests in preventing crime generally").
172. See, e.g., OPERATION COOPERATION, supra note 131, at 3 ("Community policing, with its call to
establish partnerships, requires cooperative efforts (including partnerships with 'corporate citi-
zens'), and private security is a natural partner.").
173. See, e.g., James J. Vardalis, Privatization of Public Police: Houston, Texas, 3 SECURITY J. 210,
211 (1992) (arguing that the private police officer "recognizes the importance of establishing posi-
tive relationships with the consumers of the service and develops innovative approaches to com-
munity problems. In contrast [to] the public police, lwhol are paid through the compilation of
public taxes and are, therefore, answerable to every business and citizen in the city but are not ac-
countable to them.").
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the nature of private policing. Universities offer a good example. Yet many pri-
vately policed places are poor analogues for the state-citizen relationship, and the
number of these "commercial communities" is considerable.
My discussion of these two assumptions is only a preliminary one, and their
resolution will require careful consideration over time, as partnerships become
ever more popular. What is striking, however, is that even in embryonic form,
these concerns hardly register in discussions about partnerships, which, as the
prior sections suggest, are typically presented with unalloyed enthusiasm.
And it is clear that private police have assumed an even greater importance
in the post-9/1 I world than would have been projected even in the early 1990s.
President Bush's 2003 National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical
Infrastructure and Key Assets, for example, identifies private security guards as
"an important source of protection for critical facilities."'74 Because much of the
nation's "critical infrastructure"-including its energy producers, banking and
finance operations, and transportation systems-are privately owned, private
police are "viewed by many," including the Bush Administration, "as both a
vital element of terror deterrence and the first line of response to terrorist at-
tacks." 175 The states are equally supportive of training private police as "private
counterterrorism agents."' 76 Yet, as recently as November of 2004, a Congres-
sional Research Service Report observed that "[q]uestions remain ... about ...
the appropriate role of the federal government with respect to [private police]
protecting critical infrastructure. ' '1 77
CONCLUSION
Contemporary appeals to partnership between private and public police are
striking because they harbor little of the deep-seated suspicion directed against
private police in the period after the Civil War and until the Cold War. Yet these
police filled real needs. As U.S. cities slowly established public police depart-
ments in the nineteenth century, people relied upon private detectives and pa-
174. THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 5, at 29.
175. PAUL W. PARFOMAK, GUARDING AMERICA: SECURITY GUARDS AND U.S. CRITICAL INFRA-
STRUCTURE PROTECTION CRS-1 (2004).
176. Steve Geissinger, Anti-Terrorism raining Set for Security Guards - Goal Is to Recruit 500,000
Private Agents, DAILY NEws (Los Angeles), Aug. 2,2005, at N4.
177. PARFOMAK, supra note 175, at CRS-25.
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trols to fill in perceived shortcomings of the new-public police. In rural areas and
the Western frontier, private police were sometimes the only option.
Private police involvement in labor struggles, however, provoked fears that
privately paid forces could threaten the civil rights of workers, specifically, and
the right (or obligation) of government to provide protection, generally. Con-
gressional investigations spanning a period of nearly fifty years raised questions
about the proper role of private police in society that were never fully resolved.
Critical scrutiny of private policing by the federal government disappeared
after 1950, but not because any of these matters had been settled. In the 1970s,
moreover, concerns about private policing gave way to a new language of part-
nership. In particular, reports commissioned by the federal government advo-
cated the creation of formal relationships between private and public police.
Initially reluctant, public police departments eventually chimed in with their
support. As a result, today there are numerous formal relationships established
between private and public police across the country, and the language of part-
nership permeates discussions about public police reform. Fundamental ques-
tions about the appropriate role of private police in society have disappeared.
History, however, teaches an important lesson. The enormous and largely
unregulated private police industry in this country has flourished both by public
encouragement in the form of policy statements and disengagement by failure to
regulate. In both senses, private policing is shaped by the state, and consequently,
deserves much more attention as an institution not wholly private, but public as
well.

